Snippings

Digital asset exchange Crypto.com, who paid $70 million to buy the ai.com domain for a new autonomous AI agent offering for consumers, is the latest firm to cite the rise of AI for job cuts as it lays off 12% of its workforce – around 150 people.

Marquis Software Solutions, a company the provides compliance technology to the financial services sector, says 672,075 people had their names, dates of birth, postal addresses, social security numbers, bank account and card details stolen after hackers got in to their firewall provider’s system.

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Developed by a European engineer, OpenClaw has become so popular in China that “raising a lobster” — a nod to its crustacean logo and the time needed to install and train the AI agents — has become a buzzword.

From: The AI craze that has its claws into China.

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China’s cyber security regulators have issued warnings about data breach risks tied to OpenClaw, noting that the software’s requirement for extensive system permissions presents risks.

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The National Fraud Database (NFD) recorded 1,200 cases every day in 2025 and over 444,000 in total which is the highest number ever reported in a single year.

72% of the 2025 cases were linked to identity fraud and account takeover, showing how criminals are accessing personal data to profit and attack the vulnerable.

The data showed that 2025 saw a 6% increase in recorded fraud cases from 2024, and Cifas members prevented £2.4 billion in fraud losses.

Nick Sharp, deputy director of fraud at the National Crime Agency (NCA) stated that fraud makes up 45% of all crime in England and Wales.

18% of all the findings were account takeover cases, amounting to 78,000 cases. 90% of the account takeover cases originated from online retail and personal credit cards. Unauthorised SIM swaps rose as a scheme to steal personal information in 2025.

The NFD found that identity fraud accounted for 54% of all fraud-risk cases reported in 2025, adding up to over 242,000 identify fraud cases filed. The largest amount of identity fraud cases were seen in bank accounts (over 63,00 cases) and insurance (over 16,000 cases).

From: UK’s National Fraud Database filed 444,000 fraud cases in 2025 – Cifas.

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The Financial Times reports that a “mini army” of North Korean IT operatives is increasingly using AI to pose as workers, secure jobs and earn wages from Western companies. North Korean operatives posing as remote workers infiltrated more than 300 US companies between 2020 and 2024 (according to Department of Justice figures) and Google’s Threat Intelligence Group say there are now indications that the phenomenon is spreading to Europe, with Pyongyang’s agents setting up “laptop farms” in the UK.

(To be honest, I think a great many employees of Western Companies are also using AI to pose as workers, but that’s another story.)

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What we need is less prophecy and more evidence. Less “most companies will reach the same conclusion” and more rigorous analysis of where AI is actually changing work, for whom, under what conditions, and with what consequences. That’s precisely the kind of grounded, evidence-based thinking I’ve tried to bring together in my forthcoming book, Making AI Work for Britain, which tackles these questions head-on for UK leaders navigating the gap between Silicon Valley rhetoric and UK organisational reality. As the Brookings team put it this week, research on AI and the labour market is still in the first inning. We’re making policy and restructuring decisions as if the game’s almost over.

From: Digital Economy Dispatch #276 — Lies…Damn Lies…And AI.

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We have identified industrial-scale campaigns by three AI laboratories—DeepSeek, Moonshot, and MiniMax—to illicitly extract Claude’s capabilities to improve their own models. These labs generated over 16 million exchanges with Claude through approximately 24,000 fraudulent accounts, in violation of our terms of service and regional access restrictions.

From: Detecting and preventing distillation attacks \ Anthropic.

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What if identity stayed with the transaction? In María’s case, the payment request could have carried a verifiable proof of the supplier’s identity, issued by a trusted authority and recognized across the payment ecosystem. Before sending the money, María’s phone could have shown: Verified merchant. Registered business. Credential issued by the national ID framework. If the identity did not match, the payment would trigger a clear warning.

From: Fast payments and digital ID: Making everyday payments safer, simpler, and more efficient.

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I was excited to find out that the UK’s Payments Vision Delivery Committee has now published the Payments Forward Plan for our great nation. I only read that bit about digital identity, which says, in full, that:

The government has announced that it will offer a new national digital ID scheme, free to access for anyone who wants it by the end of the Parliament. In recent months, the government has developed a comprehensive consultation about the design of that scheme, which will be launched very soon. The government will also lead a national conversation to support prioritisation of key opportunities for digital ID and digital tools.

Naturally I am looking forward to hearing more about the consultation and taking part in the national conversation.

 

 

 

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The Payments Identity Credential can be understood as a portable digital portfolio for financial services—functionally similar to a card credential, but designed for open, account-based systems and capable of operating across multiple providers and providing access to various services and functionalities. It can bundle credentials issued by multiple banks and payment service providers into a single, reusable construct, enabling interoperability across the ecosystem while preserving user choice.

By carrying a KYC verifiable credential anchored in authoritative digital ID systems, the Payments Identity Credential supports instant onboarding across providers and reduces the risk of mule accounts and synthetic identities that exploit fragmented onboarding practices. During transactions, a verifiable presentation of the payee’s identity can be embedded in a QR code or request-to-pay message, allowing users to cryptographically validate the identity of a merchant or recipient before authorizing a payment.

The Payments Identity Credential also enables trusted, consent-based data sharing and authentication. Payment transactions and related information can be bundled into verifiable credentials within the Payments Identity Credential and selectively shared to support access to credit, risk assessment, and fraud prevention without exposing raw data. Authentication credentials embedded in the Payments Identity Credential can be reused across providers and channels in a manner analogous to other payment instruments, reducing user friction while strengthening security.

At a practical level, this means three things. First, identity becomes a credential that can travel. Instead of each bank or wallet redoing checks in isolation, trusted credentials can be issued once and reused, with user consent.

From: Fast payments and digital ID: Making everyday payments safer, simpler, and more efficient.

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One place to develop this kind of regulatory approach might be the OCC, which previously developed the concept of the Special Purpose National Bank (SPNB) charter. This met with considerable criticism from fintechs who made it clear they would be reluctant to invest in such an OCC license unless such a licence would require the Federal Reserve to give them access to the payments system (so they will not have to depend on banks to intermediate and route money for them) because otherwise the significant cost and complexity of the licence process make it not worth pursuing.

The alternative, another kind of federal charter (i.e., a federal payment institution licence) would allow access to payment systems, but would not allow such institutions to provide credit. This would seem far more interesting to not only stablecoin issuers but almost all other fintechs and would separate the systemically risky provision of credit from the less risky provision of payment services.

From: (3) Accelerating Innovation in Payments – by David G.W. Birch.

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