Millions of European Union citizens should soon have access to digital wallets, as member states roll out their implementations of the European Digital Identity Regulation ahead of an end-of-the-year deadline. But the digital-identity wallets, which are intended to provide a secure and private place to store identifying information such as bank-account information, diplomas, and government IDs, such as driver’s licenses, could leave behind a trail of cryptographic clues that makes it possible to recognize someone across services. Cryptographers warn that the technology protecting individual privacy may not yet go far enough to stop people from being tracked.
Advances in cryptographic techniques since the law was passed in 2024 means this problem could be solved. However, the law doesn’t require that these techniques be used, and cryptographers that IEEE Spectrum spoke with are split as to whether the wallets should be rolled out at all without such a requirement in place, and whether they’ll be secure enough without it.
With digital wallets, when someone is asked to provide their ID, a digital, verifiable form of the ID can be transmitted, via a QR code for example. When scanned with a verification app, it would show basic identifying user information, according to Anna Lysyanskaya, a professor of computer science at Brown University.
The EU’s digital-identity regulation already includes a requirement for selective disclosure, which allows people to share only the attributes requested by the person checking identification rather than handing over an entire document. A bar checking someone’s age, for example, could request a simple confirmation that a person is over 18 and not need their full name or address..
Tracking Risks in EU Digital Wallets
When the person who requested the ID scans it, they still record some personal information, such as the digital signature and identifiers that are required to check the ID. This additional information can serve as a way of tracking a user even if the attributes shared are quite common. Two requesters could share this information to show they had interacted with the same person, says Johannes Schönrich, the director at the FIM Research Center for Information Management at the Augsburg Technical University of Applied Sciences, in Germany.
If two parties can share that information, that would be a problem: EU legislation specifies that the wallets should also be unlinkable, which means that “tracking a user by means of [these] digital attestations should not be possible,” says Schönrich.
One way to address the problem is to issue multiple versions of a user’s credentials, each with different cryptographic information attached, says Lysyanskaya. The wallet could keep track of which certificates have already been used, ensuring that a different one is presented during each interaction.
“If you allow a service provider to say, Look, I’m not supporting the Google protocol, I want a traditional verification, you essentially allow the service provider to do a kind of downgrade.”
—JAAP-HENK HOEPMAN, RADBOUD UNIVERSITY
This approach has limitations. If the issuer—the government department that creates and digitally verifies that the credential is authentic—can identify who a credential was originally issued to, it could potentially help link the different versions back to the same person, according to Lysyanskaya.
“Now anybody you’ve ever interacted with has some kind of way of tracking you,” she says.
“If this kind of interaction becomes really ubiquitous…then unless we place a tremendous amount of trust in both issuers and verifiers to guard our privacy, we may encounter a situation where everybody knows at all times what everybody else is up to, by just leaving these little digital crumbs of information about yourself.”
Lysyanskaya was one of 16 cryptographers who were invited to provide feedback for the European Commission when the law was passed in 2024. They recommended using anonymous credentials, which use zero-knowledge proofs to let people demonstrate their identity or eligibility without revealing unnecessary personal information.
How Zero-Knowledge Proofs Work
Zero-knowledge proofs allow one party to convince another that something is true without needing to send any additional information beyond the fact that it is true. For example, they would allow someone to demonstrate that they hold a valid government-issued credential, or meet a particular requirement, without revealing the underlying personal information or creating the same linkable record of the interaction, says Lysyanskaya.
If these two people, the person checking the ID and the person being asked for it ever meet again, there will be no record of any earlier encounters.
The service provider could still verify that the credential is authentic, has not expired or been revoked, and has not been manipulated. However, it would receive less information than it does under traditional verification methods.
“You learn exactly what you need, but not a single bit more about anything that might accidentally be disclosed but is not that necessary,” says Schönrich.
Zero-knowledge proofs have existed in cryptography since the 1980s, but teams of researchers have only recently developed techniques to run them on more-constrained devices like smartphones. Shortly after the EU’s digital-wallet regulations were passed in 2024, for example, a research team at Google found a way to generate zero-knowledge proofs using credentials signed with the elliptic-curve digital-signature algorithm, which generates and authenticates digital signatures efficiently enough to be used in a digital wallet.
From: How Zero-Knowledge Proofs Could Fortify EU’s Digital ID – IEEE Spectrum.