Detailed modelling of the Spanish market results in three specific conclusions
First, introducing an rCBDC without including attractive design features or stimulus policies results in low and slow adoption. This overlaps with early evidence reported for Nigeria, The Bahamas, and the People’s Republic of China (see Anthony 2022; Feng 2022; Fortis 2023; Osae-Brown, Onu, and Irrera 2023; Ree 2023; Walker 2022; Zamora-Pérez, Coschignano, and Barreiro 2022). Second, results suggest that design options differ in their effectiveness. The reverse waterfall functionality, a positive remuneration spread, and the distribution of government subsidies via rCBDC are effective in fostering adoption; yet, the distribution of government subsidies via rCBDC is the only one that fosters adoption and reduces the use of cash. Conversely, balance limits and top-up limits are effective in restraining adoption. Third, combining attractive design options and stimulus policies with limits to holding rCBDCs could be the key to achieving a sweet spot of adoption – one that is high enough to foster effective use of rCBDC but low enough to neither crowd out existing payment instruments nor threaten the stability of the financial system by, say, pushing for deposit migration
From: Simulating the Adoption of a Retail CBDC.
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