The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global inter-governmental money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) watchdog that sets “recommendations” for some 200 jurisdictions. It recently published its new “Guidance on Digital ID” (6th March 2020), specifically to encourage governments and financial institutions to use the FATF’s risk-based approach to “encourage use of digital customer onboarding” and to take advantage of “simplified due diligence” to tackle the challenges of COVD-19 whilst remaining alert to “new and emerging” risks. Don’t let the 100+ pages and the bureaucratic language put you off: this is actually pretty interesting stuff.
What was particularly interesting about the new guidelines is that, in common with the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLV), they recognise that there is role of digital onboarding beyond convenience or necessity. Paragraph 87 of the document says very clearly that given the advances in the technology and standards in the digital ID world that “non-face-to-face customer-identification and transactions that rely on reliable, independent digital ID systems with appropriate risk mitigation measures in place, may present a standard level of risk, and may even be lower-risk (my emphasis) where higher assurance levels (eg, NIST IAL2) are implemented and/or appropriate ML/TF risk control measures are in place.
Of course, digital and “face-to-face” are not alternatives. The use of digital onboarding to support and enhance face-to-face interactions to also going to accelerate. Here’s an example from Canada. In March 2020, Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) introduced an enhancement to its mobile application to allow customers to verify their identities when opening a new account in branches. The app can use the contactless interfaces in mobile phones to read the chips in electronic passports to speed things along. Why bother? Well, RBC say that when a customer verifies their identity this way, there details are immediately flashed to the computer screen of the RBC employee helping them, so giving “a stronger connection between the branch and the app” and cutting the account opening time by more than two-thirds.
(This general trend towards convergence to a mobile app and a consistent digital experience whether interacting in person or remotely is part of the transition to contact-free commerce.)

For the technically-minded digital ID community, the meat is in Recommendation 10a. This is about digital identity in the context of the identification and verification of natural persons for the purposes of CDD. The FATF talk about the key components of a digital ID system — which map to the domains in the Three Domain Identity (3DID) model that I use as shown in the picture above.
- Identity proofing, the linking of a natural person to a digital identity;
- Authentication that a person presenting credentials is the natural person that the credentials return to;
- Portability of credentials between different applications and environment.
Since the FATF made the new recommendations, regulators around the world have issued their own statements supporting such action including the UK’s FCA, Hong Kong’s HKMA and the US FinCEN as James Mirfin of Refinitiv pointed out. In the UK, for example, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issued a letter noting that while organisations have to meet their obligations under the relevant regulations (in this case, the UK’s Money Laundering Regulations 2017), they can be flexible. Now, some of this flexibility is a little old school (allow people send send scanned documents as PDFs by e-mail instead of producing original documents, for example, is what I label “digitised identity”) but some of it is, I think, a considered and sound response to the new environment. The FCA will accept “third-party verification” (where a lawyer or accountant corroborates data) and, in a step towards the federated digital identity of the future (the “financial services passport” that I have been going on about for years), organisations can rely on CDD performed by other organisations (the example given is the obvious one of customer’s primary bank account provider) and on commercial providers who “triangulate” data sources to verify documentation.
The recommendations themselves contain some other interesting provisions. The core of the approach recommended is this: if you are provided with a government-approved digital identity (eg, eIDAS in Europe) then accept it, if you are provided with a non-government approved digital identity then you must either undertake an “assurance test” or have a third-party do it for you. However, the level of assurance can be varied so the in areas where there are lower risks, lower assurance digital identity verification is acceptable (I’m a tech guy, so I suspect that only a lawyer can interpret what “acceptable” means here). Furthermore, where there are risks of financial exclusion, organisations can be more flexible (by, for example, using the third-party verification as per the FCA letter). This could be critical in many jurisdictions where government stimulus payments to both individuals ad businesses can be held up, subverted or even diverted because of the lack of digital identities.
None of us who have predicted that digital identity will be central to the new economy would have wanted it this way, it goes without saying. But as I wrote on Medium in “COVID, Cryptography and Certificates”, the fact of the matter is that the response to the current pandemic, and the preparation for the next one, will bring digital identity to the top of the strategic agenda for individuals, businesses and governments alike. Let’s make sure that we (the identity industry) respond with cost-effective and efficient solutions that deliver both privacy and security to the benefit of all stakeholders.