Feds bust Texas man for using PPP loan of nearly $1 million on cryptocurrency

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Joshua Argires received nearly $1 million from the federal Paycheck Protection Program to help 51 employees at his “Texas Barbecue” to weather the COVID outbreak.

But according to federal law enforcement, Texas Barbecue had no employees and only a website with nothing for sale. Meanwhile, Argiries allegedly sent the $956,250 he received to an account at the cryptocurrency company Coinbase via a series of five wire transfers.

From Feds bust Texas man for using PPP loan of nearly $1 million on cryptocurrency:

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Electric Crypto Balkan Acid Test | Alexander Clapp

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Then there is the cryptocurrency, fake money befitting a country of phantom sovereignty. Its production results in no material object—apart, that is, from the megatons of carbon it releases into the atmosphere—and nothing in the way of societal benefit.

From Electric Crypto Balkan Acid Test | Alexander Clapp:

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POST All the news that’s fit to ID

I came across an interesting story via my old chum Charles Arthur’s consistently interesting “Overspill” blog. The story concerns on Oliver Taylor, a student at England’s University of Birmingham. From his picture, he appears to be normal looking twenty-something. From his profile he appears to be a coffee-loving politics junkie with an interest in anti-Semitism and Jewish affairs, with bylines in the Jerusalem Post and the Times of Israel.

Why is this interesting? For two reasons. First of all because I was involved in an interesting Twitter debate with two thoughtful identity commentators, Tim Bouma and Jonathan Williams during which this issue of “anonymous” contributions to newspapers happened to come in to the conversation and it made me think about the same issues as Charles’ story.

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Secondly, because the picture was created by an AI. It’s a fake face that doesn’t belong to any living human being. It was composed to be a human face that any of us would be able to recognise and distinguish, but it is entirely synthetic. Oh, and Oliver doesn’t exist

Charles notes that “two newspapers that published his work say they have tried and failed to confirm his identity”. But wait. Shouldn’t newspapers try and fail to confirm someone’s identity before they publish a story?

Well, no. That doesn’t work. What about whistleblowers? What about privacy in general? If the newspaper knows who Tim Bouma is then his personal data is at risk should the newspaper be compromised or co-opted. There seems to be a conflict between newspapers wanting honest opinions and newspapers needed to know identities, even if they are hopeless and telling a real person from a fake one.

The way out of this dead end is to understand that what the newspaper should be checking for this kind of story is not the identity of the correspondent but their credentials. I doesn’t matter who Oliver Taylor is, it matters what Oliver Taylor is. It ought to be part of our national digital identity strategy (which we don’t have) to create a National Entitlement Scheme (NES) instead of some daft 1950s throwback digitised version of a national identity card. In the NES, it then becomes part of the warp and weft of everyday life for Oliver to post his comments along with his anonymous IS_A_PERSON credit and his anonymous IS_A_STUDENT (BIRMINGHAM) credential.

That way, the newspaper gets the information it needs to make the story of interest and perhaps worth publishing, while even if they are socially-engineered by genius hackers, they cannot disclose the real identity of the correspondent because they don’t know it. The mention of social-engineering, by the way, brings into focus the recent Twitter hack. What’s generally true for newspapers is generally true for Twitter: who I am is none of their business.

Incidentally, it doesn’t take hackers to obtain personal information from Twitter because as I am sure you will recall, two of their former employees of Twitter have been charged in the US with spying for Saudi Arabia. The charges, unsealed on Wednesday in San Francisco, allege that Saudi agents sought personal information about Twitter users including known critics of the Saudi government. If Twitter doesn’t have your personal information, then it can’t  be leaked, stolen or corrupted. There is a way forward, and cryptography can deliver it using tried and tested techniques.

FORBES INM Oliver and nightclub

I came across an interesting story via my old chum Charles Arthur’s consistently interesting “Overspill” blog. The story concerns on Oliver Taylor, a student at England’s University of Birmingham. From his picture, he appears to be normal looking twenty-something. From his profile he appears to be a coffee-loving politics junkie with an interest in anti-Semitism and Jewish affairs, with bylines in the Jerusalem Post and the Times of Israel.

Why is this interesting? Because the picture was created by an AI. It’s a fake face that doesn’t belong to any living human being. It was composed to be a human face that any of us would be able to recognise and distinguish, but it is entirely synthetic. Oh, and Oliver doesn’t exist. Charles notes that “two newspapers that published his work say they have tried and failed to confirm his identity”.

Wait. Shouldn’t newspapers try and fail to confirm someone’s identity before they publish a story. Well, no. That doesn’t work. What about whistleblowers? What about privacy in general? The way out of this dead end is to understand that what the newspaper should be checking for this kind of story is not the identity of the correspondent but their credentials. I doesn’t matter who Oliver Taylor is, it matters what Oliver Taylor is. It ought to be part of our national digital identity strategy (which we don’t have) to create a National Entitlement Scheme (NES) instead of some daft 1950s throwback digitised version of a national identity card. In the NES, it then becomes part of the warp and weft of everyday life for Oliver to post his comments along with his psedonymous IS_A_PERSON credential.

Well in the UK, as in the US, we don’t have a digital identity infrastructure (or in fact any other form of identity infrastructure) and the shambolic approach to identity is manifest in a daily litany of frauds, frictions and fantasies (often from the government). Here is an absolutely typical example: a nightclub is issuing its own identity cards since it can no longer rely on any of the other forms of “identification” that are in use. The nightclub manager says that the number of people presenting fake IDs is  crazy, so the nightclub is going to issue its own identity cards with a picture on them. In order to get one of these cards, customers will need to present “two forms of up-to-date official ID” (not entirely sure what this means, since there is no “official ID” in the UK) and then in order to get into the club, customers will need either one of these club cards or a passport or a driving licence.

 

Before I continue with this specific example, let me make a general point about how I think these things should work in an always on, connected world. First of all, retailers and other service providers should all have their own virtual identity, or persona, for every customer because they need to be able to communicate and connect with those customers in order to deliver better services and products. In essence, every customer should have a loyalty card. The contents of that card should be unique to each service provider and any compromise of it should not lead to compromise with other service providers. In a digital identity world, this sort of thing is straightforward. You present a virtual identity from an organisation that is acceptable to the nightclub (e.g., a bank) and they send you back another virtual identity that contains things of relevance to the nightclub, such as your customer number and preferences.

In the virtual world, this makes sense because your mobile phone can store millions or billions of loyalty cards. In the “real” world, it will be really annoying to carry around thousands of loyalty cards with you wherever you go, but when those loyalty cards are (essentially) public key certificates then there is no problem.

So let’s go back to the nightclub and see how they might progress on a digital world, by creating a loyalty card based on digital identity infrastructure. Doing things this way has three distinct advantages. First of all, if you are a nightclub then your bar staff may well not be at MI5 levels when it comes to spotting a fake Romanian passport but they might be able to spot a fake version of your nightclub identity. (In practice, of course, they wouldn’t have to because the validity of the card will be checked by their phones). Secondly, by giving every customer loyalty card you are able to interact with them securely (in technical terms you can always send messages encrypted to that persona). Finally, as the nightclub manager himself notes, “we can also ban people and remove the card at our discretion, giving us more control and creating a safer environment”.

On a commercial note. you might wonder why organisations that already spend a lot of money on working out who people are (e.g., banks) don’t take this sunk cost and transform it into a revenue stream. I’ve more than once been told by a bank that there is no business for providing ID as a service to business customers, when clearly this nightclub (to pick just one example) is perfectly prepared to spend money on creating its own identity service when I’m sure the management would much rather that their efforts be directed towards running a nightclub.

Banks should be looking forwards by creating a digital identity infrastructure and then selling products and services based on the infrastructure to, for example, nightclubs. That way, the nightclubs could produce their own branded app (by adding a skin to a generic multi-bank identity app, for example) and pay the bank a pound to testify to the age of the holder rather than waste money having to do it for themselves.

The Escalating War Between Our Physical and Digital Realities — The Information

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Democracy, and much of our decision-making for allocating scarce resources in the physical world, requires a singular identity so people have a clear reputation and social capital balances they care about. The innovation and freedom of the digital space presupposes freedom of multiple identities. It is hard to see how these two frameworks can truly coexist. And frankly, it is hard to see much of the internet functioning with real names and identities, just as it is hard to see voting and decision-making work in a world of pseudonymity and disposable identity.

From The Escalating War Between Our Physical and Digital Realities — The Information:

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Hackers Convinced Twitter Employee to Help Them Hijack Accounts

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All tech companies face the issue of malicious insiders. Motherboard has previously revealed how Facebook employees used their privilege access to user data to stalk women; how Snapchat workers had a tool called Snaplion that provides information on users; and how MySpace employees abused a tool called “Overlord” to spy on users during the site’s hayday.

From Hackers Convinced Twitter Employee to Help Them Hijack Accounts:

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