FORBES There are no “challenger banks”

I think it’s time for another review of terminology and I’ve got a couple of suggestions. Let’s standardise this way: a “neo-bank” is something that looks like bank, but isn’t (eg, my Simple account when I first got it and before they were taken over by BBVA, which is an actual bank, and then shut down), whereas a “near-bank” is something that performs a function traditionally associated with banks but isn’t a bank and doesn’t look like a bank (eg, Wise). Then we have the non-bank, which isn’t a bank and doesn’t perform a function traditionally associated with banks but nevertheless embeds financial services (such as an accounts package that uses transactional data to deliver data-driven liquidity). Oh, and then we have challenger banks.

Challenger banks are not a special or different kind of bank. They are just banks. They may be banks, neo-banks or near-banks or non-banks that perhaps address a new niche, or deliver interesting new functionality into an existing niche, but they are not a distinct category. They are banks. That’s it. So when people talk about the “challengers” to the incumbent big banks, I do not see Monzo in my fevered imagination, but Amazon. It’s BigTech that is the real challenger.

In this framework, my guess is that Amazon would probably aim to be a neo-bank or a near-bank. It will embed financial services, such as small business financing, but will it look like bank. Why would it? Amazon know infinitely more about marketing than I do, so I wouldn’t presume to advice them on. Amazon sees banks as utility providers of the financial services that it is delivering to its customers.

This is not a new idea, by the way. In 1997, one of the first serious articles I ever wrote (with my colleague Mike Young) was for Internet Research (Volume 7, Number 2, p.120-128). It was called “Financial Services and the Internet” and explored the (then new) potential for the new entrants to assemble banking services depending on the customers’ needs while using the emerging infrastructure would allow customers to build their own financial services with, as we put it at the time, “the underlying best-of-breed products originating from a wide range of suppliers”. We also wrote that the manufacturers of financial services (eg, banks) would “retreat to a small range of products that build on core competencies, but supplied to a global market”. It is the techfins (including Amazon) that I wrote about before who are precisely the kind of organisations who can take these products (eg, unsecured personal credit) to those markets.

Two decades after that first article, I wrote about the changing environment and pointing out that changes in regulation “mean the tech giants will soon be able to access customers’ bank account data” and that companies such as Google would take this obvious step in order to gain access to financial services infrastructure without the overheads and scrutiny that a banking licence involves. A couple of years later we see the case study of the Irish central bank’s decision to authorise Google Payment Ireland under the second Payment Services Directive (PSD2). This attracted a fair bit of comment at the time, some of it informed. As many observers (eg, me) pointed out, this does not grant Google with the ability to offer a full banking service including bank accounts, but they don’t need to because with a PI licence they can obtain API access to bank accounts to offer Payment Initiation Services (PIS) and Account Information services (AIS)

(It was obvious move for Google. My good friend Simon Lelieveldt noted in his blog on the subject, that this makes “Google Brexit-proof and PSD2-proof” which would be reason enough to do it, but it’s important to understand just how disruptive this licence might be. In Europe, there is nothing that the banks can do to stop the techfins from becoming a neo-banks. PSD2 means that bank customers will give Techfins permission to access their bank accounts, at which point the techfins will become the interface between the customer and financial services.)

CivicScience | Infographic: One-Third of Americans Want to Eliminate the Penny

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With a nationwide coin shortage complicating cash transactions — not to mention the fact that Americans are increasingly wary of handling cash mid-pandemic — CivicScience surveyed more than 2,500 U.S. adults (ages 18+) about their thoughts on coinage. It turns out that a substantial portion of the country wants to nix the penny.

From CivicScience | Infographic: One-Third of Americans Want to Eliminate the Penny:

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YES Bank deploys AI robot to interact with customers on WhatsApp

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India’s YES Bank has launched banking service on WhatsApp, using a chatbot interface to offer over 60 financial products over the messaging app. The bot uses conversational AI with extensive financial knowledge to make carrying out banking tasks simpler. Customers can ask bots to check account balances, order cheque books, report unauthorised transactions, redeem rewards points, connect with online and telephone call centres, and apply for 60+ banking products.

From YES Bank deploys AI robot to interact with customers on WhatsApp:

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Possibly largest ever bust of banknote counterfeiters in the history of the euro | Europol

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On the action day on 15 July 2020, officers from the Italian Carabinieri Corps (Carabinieri) and its specialised Anti-Counterfeit Currency Unit arrested 44 suspects and froze criminal assets worth €8 million in Italy.

Asset recovery measures taken so far during the overall operation in Italy include the confiscation of 50 apartments, 8 business premises, 2 farms, 10 companies operating in various sectors, 12 vehicles, 1 luxurious boat and 22 bank accounts, all with an estimated total value of approximately €8 million

From Possibly largest ever bust of banknote counterfeiters in the history of the euro | Europol:

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Cash, Legal Tender and the Future of Euro Banknotes | Cash & Payment News

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The hearings relate to a legal challenge against the Hessischer Rundfunk, the German public broadcaster, which is accused of not accepting payments for an obligatory fee in euro cash. The plaintiffs argue that this refusal is in violation of the status of euro banknotes and coins as legal tender.

From Cash, Legal Tender and the Future of Euro Banknotes | Cash & Payment News:

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POST Spoof

 

 

The upshot is that when you see the number of an incoming call, you have no way of knowing if the number displayed on your caller ID is legitimate or spoofed.

 

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Spoofing happens because the carriers don’t verify that a phone number is real before a call crosses their networks.

From How to stop robocalls spamming your phone | TechCrunch:

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One authentication system would make call spoofing nearly impossible, known as Secure Telephone Identity Revisited and Signature-based Handling of Asserted Information Using Tokens — or STIR/SHAKEN. The system relies on every phone number having a unique digital signature which, when checked against the cell networks will prove you are a real caller. The carrier then approves the call and patches it through to the recipient. This happens near-instantly.

 

From How to stop robocalls spamming your phone | TechCrunch:

 

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companies on each end of a phone call.

 

Photo: Dan Saelinger
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which works on issues related to secure telephone identity, began work on STIR in 2013. The IETF designed the STIR protocol to be very flexible. The basic mechanism is a certificate issued to authenticated callers. However, STIR requires individuals to be proactive about authenticating themselves and managing their personal key, which confirms their identity. STIR’s downside is that very few people have the expertise to do either. The good news is that STIR’s flexibility allows phone companies to implement it in their network with minimal hassle.

 

In 2015, ATIS also began studying mechanisms to reduce unwanted robocalls. A joint task force between ATIS and the SIP Forum, an industry association, built upon the IETF’s work on STIR.

 

As it turned out, STIR’s extreme flexibility was a problem. Indeed, the protocol’s flexibility made it easy for each phone company to implement it in its network. However, as a general rule, the more flexible a protocol is, the more likely it is that different implementations won’t play well together. So when two different service providers implement the protocol on each of their networks, a caller ID sent from one to the other might not make it through intact. The task force’s goal was to create a precisely defined subset (known as a profile) of STIR, called SHAKEN. Because the task force specified the SHAKEN profile of the STIR protocol, you might see it referred to as “STIR/SHAKEN.”

 

From How Your Phone Company Aims to Stop Robocalls – IEEE Spectrum:

 

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What Carriers Know
Phone companies don’t always know everything about a call. STIR/SHAKEN uses levels of attestation so that carriers can classify what they do know about each call.

 

A–Attestation B–Attestation C–Attestation
Originates on carrier’s own network Originates on carrier’s own network Originates on some other network
Carrier has confirmed who the caller is Carrier has confirmed who the caller is Carrier has NOT confirmed who the caller is
Carrier has verified caller’s right to use the phone number Carrier has NOT verified caller’s right to use the phone number Carrier has NOT verified caller’s right to use the phone number

 

From How Your Phone Company Aims to Stop Robocalls – IEEE Spectrum:

 

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31st March 2020 

 

FCC Mandates STIR/SHAKEN to Combat Spoofed Robocalls all originating and terminating voice service providers to implement
STIR/SHAKEN in the Internet Protocol (IP) portions of their networks by June 30, 2021,

 

From FCC Mandates STIR/SHAKEN to Combat Spoofed Robocalls | Federal Communications Commission:

 

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Earlier this year, networking services firm Transaction Network Services reported that just 10% of “high risk” robocalls originate from tier 1 carriers (AT&T, CenturyLink, Comcast, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon), even though they account for 75% of total call volume. Instead, hundreds of smaller, non-tier 1 networks are the source of most robocalls.

From Approach aims to authenticate calls and deter illegal caller ID spoofing.:

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OFCOM

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has developed a new technical standard to support CLI
authentication, so that valid numbers can be identified and marked from the beginning of a call and
passed along the ‘call chain’ to the recipient.8 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)9 set a
deadline for December 2019 for the implementation of CLI authentication. In Canada, the deadline is
September 2020. Implementation of CLI authentication in the UK will take more time, as not as
many calls are currently carried on VoIP systems. We expect CLI authentication to be introduced
when voice services are migrated to IP platforms, away from the copper-based network, by mid-
2020s.

Challenger and neo-banks from Brazil. What makes them different? (beta)

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Any article on neo-banks in Brazil (or anywhere in the world for that matter) would not be complete without Nu. Weighing in at over 20 million customers, this bank is the biggest neo on the face of the Earth and has a strong presence in both Mexico and Argentina.

Challenger and neo-banks from Brazil. What makes them different? (beta):

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Anthropologies of Risk: Credit Scoring in Coercive Political Economies. Ethnographic notes from North India – Aftermoney.dk

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Their lack of credit history and collateral make them too risky for commercial banks and other formal institutions to lend to them.  In fact, their actual risk levels and creditworthiness are seldom assessed, due to the lack of systematic data about their households’ finances.

Anthropologies of Risk: Credit Scoring in Coercive Political Economies. Ethnographic notes from North India – Aftermoney.dk:

I remember learning about this in the early days of M_PESA. The ability to use transactional records as a substitute for conventional credit ratings 

Anthropologies of Risk: Credit Scoring in Coercive Political Economies. Ethnographic notes from North India – Aftermoney.dk

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Vernacular evaluations of credit risk and relations that produce credibility through cash (‘money-cash’ and ‘in-kind’ cash) at the local level are not taken into consideration and integrated in the statistical centered credit rating tools – developed by banks and social fin-techs.

Anthropologies of Risk: Credit Scoring in Coercive Political Economies. Ethnographic notes from North India – Aftermoney.dk:

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Anthropologies of Risk: Credit Scoring in Coercive Political Economies. Ethnographic notes from North India – Aftermoney.dk

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This popular Marwari saying crystallises how the capacity of getting loans at a just interest (or without interest) is linked to the borrower-family/household’s honour rather than being just a matter of bank statements’ analysis and financial projections.

Anthropologies of Risk: Credit Scoring in Coercive Political Economies. Ethnographic notes from North India – Aftermoney.dk:

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