Lee Reiners, writing in the Wall Street Journal, says that there are no obvious benefits to cryptocurrencies “beyond the chance to make a quick buck”. He goes to say that “I have yet to identify a single task or process that crypto makes easier, better, cheaper or faster” but I think that this misses the key point that (eg) Bitcoin was never designed to be easier, better, cheaper or faster. It was designed to be censorship-resistant, which is why it is so good for ransomware.
This has turned out to be something of a problem. The FBI reported a 225% increase in total losses from ransomware in the United States in 2020. According to the Cybereason Global Ransomware Study measured how much financial and reputational damage these attacks wreak on businesses and found, rather interestingly, that four-fifths of the organizations who were hit by ransomware and paid up were subsequently hit again (and almost half were hit by the same threat group). With attacks escalating week on week, it’s time for action. But what action?
The Insitute for Security and Technology said, in their “Ransomware Task Force Report” back in January, that cryptocurrency should be more closely regulated and the governments around the world should require exchanges, crypto-kiosks (such as Bitcoin ATMs) and over-the-counter (OTC) operators to comply with Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), and Combatting Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws.
Well, yeah. But to try to stop money flowing in and out of ransomware enterprises will be something of a challenge. Right now, the bad guys collect their loot and then switch it out through interesting schemes, such as the “treasure men” dead drops. A treasure man is some who will take your (traceable) Bitcoin and then leave (untraceable) cash hidden somewhere: buried in a park, for example. Once the treasure man has your bitcoins, he or she will then send you the co-ordinates. (The Financial Times reports that the Russian-language Hydra web site offers a wide variety of cash-out options, including treasure troves and iTunes vouchers.)
Nicholas Weaver wrote that “we don’t have a ransomware problem, we have a Bitcoin problem”. And he’s right. But it does make me wonder why. Why, that is, do criminals use non-fungible Bitcoin that can be tracked and traced and monitored to see where it does rather than some other cryptocurrency that offers real anonymity? (Once again demonstrating the impending explicit pricing of privacy, the Sodinokibi payment website last year began charging 10% more for Bitcoin ransoms compared to the more private Monero cryptocurrency and I understand that the Colonial attackers raised this to 20%.)
Ransomware is a scale problem, automated by cryptocurrency, but there are plenty of other crimes and plenty of other criminals who are looking to censorship resistance and privacy to turbocharge their own activities. In Norway, for example, the National CyberCrime Center is trying to pry open Monero (as well as Dash, another crypto asset known for privacy) in connection with the well-document search for the missing wife of one of Norway’s richest men.
What can be done? If we assume that cryptographic innovation will continue to
So what are we going to to?
Society’s response to ransomware is an example of a collective action problem. The public would be better off if everyone cooperated and refused to pay money to ransomware operators. With no incoming ransom income, the ransomware business would be unprofitable, attacks would cease and the collateral damage would stop.
From Ban All Ransomware Payments, in Bitcoin or Otherwise – CoinDesk:
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