Why not maybe? – Chris Skinner’s blog

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Americans are parking more money with the biggest banks than ever before, cementing the firms’ dominance of the financial industry less than a decade after the 2008 crisis. The three largest U.S. banks by assets have added more than $2.4 trillion in domestic deposits over the past 10 years, a 180% increase, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of regulatory data. That amount exceeds what the top eight banks had in such deposits combined in 2007.

From Why not maybe? – Chris Skinner’s blog:

Similarly, in the UK, the biggest banks now have significantly more accounts than they did before the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) despite the onslaught of the “challenger” banks.

Air conditioning is one of the greatest inventions of the 20th Century. It’s also killing the 21st

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Air conditioning is one of those inventions that have become so ubiquitous, that many in the developed world don’t even realize that less than a century ago, it didn’t exist.

From Air conditioning is one of the greatest inventions of the 20th Century. It’s also killing the 21st:

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POST Access

There are many players in the cryptocurrency space (Avanti Bank, for example, which aims to provide custody services for institutional investors in cryptocurrencies, as well as cryptocurrency exchange Kraken) who want to get access to the Federal Reserve payments systems that are currently the preserve of the “traditional” banks. Right now, they have to partner with the banks that have accounts at the Fed because they are not allowed Fed accounts of their own.

Naturally, as the Wall Street Journal observes, in article titled “Crypto Firms Want Fed Payment Systems Access”, the incumbent banks are pushing back.

 

To be honest I think that headline is a little misleading because Avanti and Kraken are not “crypto currency companies”, they are actually banks. Both have “special purpose” bank charters in Wyoming. But in my opinion, it is not only those organisations that should direct access to the payment systems but a great many fintechs and non-bank competitors.

Such access is not, by the way, a pipe dream.

 

You might remember that last year I wrote about giving non-banks access to the UK payment infrastructure.

There are plenty of non-bank players out there who want to have access to the infrastructure and the UK’s Emerging Payments Association recently presented a report to arguing that, under the appropriate licence conditions, non-banks should be allowed access to instant payments infrastructure through the use of a new kind of limited pre-funded settlement account at the Bank of England.

From Access | Consult Hyperion

Well, this is exactly what is going to happen.`

The widely-trailed move is expected to open up a competitive space which has long been the preserve of the UK’s biggest incumbents, providing non-bank PSPs with direct access to the UK’s sterling payment systems that settle in central bank money, including Faster Payments, Bacs, Chaps, Link, Visa, and, once live, the new digital cheque imaging system.

From Bank of England comes good on promise to provide non-banks with dir…

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In the UK, the Bank of England decided some years ago it would give direct access to non-banks who were able to fulfil reasonable conditions. The first of these was the foreign exchange fintech now known as Wise (a particular favourite of mine as I use their excellent service frequently) and others followed. A more recent example to study is Modulr (which recently secured new investment from FIS Ventures) and provides Payments-as-a-Service (PasS) api platform for software companies that deliver services to primary small and medium-sized businesses. These companies can deliver better services to their customers because of this direct connection.

The Bank is now pushing the boundaries even further. With all the fuss about their retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) taskforce, the Bank of England’s other big announcement didn’t get the same degree of attention, but as I pointed out here in Forbes earlier this year, it may have just as big an impact. To recap: the Bank announced a new kind of settlement account, known as an “omnibus” account, that allows for the wholesale use of central bank money in interesting new ways. The operator of a payment system can hold funds in the omnibus account to fund their participants’ balances with central bank money. This will allow them to offer innovative payment services, while having the security of central bank money settlement.

One of the first users of such as an account will be Fnality, formerly known as the the Utility Settlement Coin (USC). Fnality is now backed by 15 major financial institutions, ranging from Barclays and State Street to UBS and ING, and plans to go live once its application for an omnibus account is approved. will be able to go live once it’s approved. As Huw van Steenis, a former advisor to Mark Carney wrote, this may mean that Britain may have the world’s first synthetic digital currency system for wholesale payments — backed by a central bank — as early as next year. As he put it, this will have a profound impact on the role of banks in settlement so “this is what to watch, not the Bahamas’ sand dollar“.

So in principle, I couldn’t agree more with Caitlin Long, the Avanti CEO, who said granting direct access to the Fed’s payment systems to banks that cater to the digital asset sector should be welcomed because doing so would bring them “under the watchful eyes of regulators”.

George Selgin, who is a thorough scholar of such things and an expert on the evolution of payment services, wrote an excellent piece for The Hill making precisely this point, calling on the Fed to follow the example the Bank of England set in 2017 by providing “master accounts” to non-banks. In the UK, for example, Wise (formerly Transferwise) has a settlement account at the Bank of England and therefore access to the same payment rails that banks do.

 

I am strongly in favour of allowing crypto currency companies direct access to safe systems, as are serious economists, but with one obvious and important provides a: they must meet the same basic requirements and syntax, and indeed as banks, when it comes to customer due diligence. I am all in favour of competition in financial services and I think competition payment systems is a wholly good thing. What situation where expenses can reduce their cost base at the expense of the safety and security of society as a whole.

The Bank Policy Institute, which represents large banks, and the Independent Community Bankers of America sent in a letter to the Fed recently arguing that “such applicants will pose heightened risks regarding matters of anti-money-laundering, cybersecurity and consumer protection, as well as safety and soundness,”

 

In practice this means doing something about know your customer and anti-money laundering processes, but doing in a much more cost-effective way than we are accustomed to.

There are a couple of obvious options here. On the K YC side we need to introduce some sort of federated, previously enhancing know your customer. The obvious people to do this would be the banks themselves which is why I’m hoping that the new G a high N initiative may get some traction. Another way forward, tapping the costs of AML, would be to treat better AML as part of an overall digital transformation process rather than an end in itself. I noticed a recent paper from that explored whistle from and I found the discussions and other interest.

So yes let’s open up bed just as I want to see other players opened up in the name of competition. But let’s not sacrifice safety and security. That’s not an acceptable price for progress in the payment system.

Gartner Reprint

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Description

PEC comprises three types of technologies that protect data while it’s being used to enable secure data processing and data analytics:
The first provides a trusted environment in which sensitive data can be processed or analyzed. It includes trusted third parties and hardware-trusted execution environments (also called confidential computing).
The second performs processing and analytics in a decentralized manner. It includes federated machine learning and privacy-aware machine learning.
The third transforms data and algorithms before processing or analytics. It includes differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, zero-knowledge proofs, private set intersection and private information retrieval.
Each technology provides specific secrecy and privacy guarantees, and some can be combined for greater efficacy.

From Gartner Reprint:

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A deluge of data is giving rise to a new economy | The Economist

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ut data also have characteristics of a public good, which ought to be used as widely as possible to maximise wealth creation. New institutions must be created to reflect this tension, as was the case for intellectual property.

From A deluge of data is giving rise to a new economy | The Economist:

One such class of institution might be a form of “data trust”.

15Mb after 24th September The Data Gap

In their fascinating paper on “The Data Economy: Market Size and Global Trade” for the Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence
(part of the UK’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research), Diane Coyle and Wendy Li talk about the growing “data gap” between global Big Tech and potential competitors, disruptors and innovators. They argue (convincingly) that this data gap is a a barrier to entry that affects not only businesses but also aggregate innovation, investment and trade:

Large data holdings, rich in volume and variety, thus give large online platforms a significant competitive advantage, powered by network effects and the virtuous cycle between data and the AI algorithms improving the services and increasing revenues.

This advantage means that the platforms obtain insights about adjacent sectors and can then enter them more easily. Potential new competitors without access to that data and the advantage that is confers therefore must struggle to enter the markets. This has been obvious for some time. Indeed, the EU’s “A Europe fit for the Digital Age” initiative launched in 2020 made a central observation that the market power provided by the data advantage allows a handful of large players to unfairly leverage into new markets.

That all sounds qualitatively correct, but is there quantitative evidence?

That’s a difficult question to answer. Most data flows around out of the view of statisticians and there is no way to measure the value the of data. Statistics Canada tried to estimate the value of the country’s data in 2019 and came up with somewhere between c$160-220 billion. For comparison, that would make the value of all the data in America something in the region of $1.4-2 trillion (which would be nearly 5% of America’s stock of private physical capital).

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A good place to start analysing any economy is by measuring it. A robust methodology has yet to be developed, but the data economy is already large. Statistics Canada, a government agency, last year tried to estimate the value of the country’s data (its stock plus related software and intellectual property in the field). The result was between c$157bn and c$218bn ($118bn and $164bn). If that number is close—a big “if”—the value of all the data in America, whose gdp is 12 times that of Canada, could amount to $1.4trn-2trn, which would be nearly 5% of America’s stock of private physical capital.

From A deluge of data is giving rise to a new economy | The Economist:

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Relatively crude measures exist for estimating the size of the data economy, yet for the USA, estimations are that it was between $1.4trn-2trn in 2019 (including software and intellectual property) (“A Deluge of Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy,” 2020), while projection for the EU27 data economy by the European commision are at €829bln in 2025 (up from €301bln in 2018) (European Commission, 2020b).

From New data economy | Swarm Enterprise Hub:

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That’s a pretty significant sum. But, as The Economist notes, that while the data economy is clearly large, a robust measurement has yet to be developed. This is why Diane and Wendy’s paper was so interesting to me. They propose a new and consistent “impact-based” approach to estimate the size of the overall data market in a sector by comparing the values of data with and without the entry of an online platform. They use the impact of AirBnB on the hospitality sector an example, and calculate the market size for data in the global hospitality sector as USD $43 billion in 2018, growing on average at the rate of one-third per annum. But as their calculations show, the benefits of this growing market are not distributed evenly.

That rate of growth and its distribution would seem to confirm that the online platforms’ disruption of incumbents’ firm-specific knowledge is fast and significant. This may be why a number of online platforms are adopting the “super-app” approach pioneered in the China because the ability to combine data from multiple sources is even more advantageous than we might thing, meaning that the platforms impact may be “accelerated or multiplicative”.

Super-apps are yet another confirmation that data isn’t the new oil. It doesn’t get used up as it is refined. Instead the use of data produces even more data and the more this reservoir data grows the more it feeds innovations and generates positive externalities.

Bits and Borders

This methodological analysis gets even more interesting when applied at the aggregate level, as it shows that there is one large developed country that is a net importer of data and a net exporter of digital goods: yes, as you would guess, its the United States. America’s online platforms collect data from around the world to feed centralised digital production in the US. China is also a net data importer and digital goods exporter although more of its digital consumers are domestic. The UK, by comparison, has no dominant local platforms. We are net data exporters with a sound digital infrastructure but a disadvantage in data and given that data is what we need to produce added-value digital goods, it’s a pretty serious disadvantage.

Meanwhile, many countries are revising their data policies and localisation rules in a thrust for “digital sovereignty”. This is a useful catch-all descriptions of the many ways that governments try to assert more control over their digital infrastructure. It has long been a concern in supply chains, affecting the kinds of hardware and software available in a given market. Now, of course, this form of resurgent nationalism is fragmenting the cloud. Governments around the world are passing measures that require companies to host infrastructure and store certain kinds of data in local servers. Some also require companies that operate within their borders to provide the government with access to data and code stored in the cloud. 

These policies are not currently based on economic calculation, which is why the measurement data markets should help  policymakers understand the dynamics and contribute to localisation policies. But also, it must be said, because the data imports and exports are not directly related to the creation and distribution of the value of data. Data flows do not reflect the value derived from data.

(In the paper Diane and Wendy illustrate this point using the example of Taiwan. Google has two data centers in Taiwan to support its operation in Asia. This means that there are large cross-border data flows between Taiwan and other countries, but Taiwan is unlikely to
receive most of the benefits.)

Blocking data flows is sort of metaverse mercantilism that benefits no-one. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR, a prominent think tank) published a call for action on “Defending Europe’s Economic Sovereignty” last year in which that called for the EU (and the UK) to agree data free-flow with the US, prohibiting forced sensitive data transfers and introducing a dispute settlement mechanism. Data sharing will enable a greater degree of entry and competition, driving more innovations.

Diane and Wendy conclude that an open data-sharing ecosystem will increase productivity and therefore economic wellbeing. From my inexpert perspective, I could not agree more. We have entered an era of data hoarding where companies are now storing any and all of the data that they can get their hands on just in case it will be worth something in the future. But as it sits in these hoards, that data is not working to the greater good.

This, to my mind, is yet more support for the idea of taking on the data misers and forcing them to share data to the benefit of competition and the economy as whole. We already know what do it. Open banking was a good place to begin the attack on data hoarding by incumbents and we are learning a lot as the paradigm spreads. Open finance is an obvious next step. But policymakers should be set the firm goal of open data in all sectors (except possibly national security) in mind and start working towards it. The fintech sector’s demands should be maximal: open everything.

POST Please sir, can I have some more?

Oliver Dowden, the UK’s Minister for Culture and such like, got a lot of criticism this week 

However, as Diane Coyle and Wendy Li pointed out in their paper on “The Data Economy: Market Size and Global Trade” for the Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (part of the UK’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research) recently, GDPR restricts firms from repurposing data beyond its original intended use without re-obtaining consent from individuals (to safeguard privacy,) which limits data sharing among firms.

(It’s not all about regulation, of course. Many companies are reluctant to share data with others, either because of market position of perhaps sometime because they do not understand the value of the data.)

This is where there is a new approach that fintechs can build on. Using cryptographic techniques that I group together under the label of “counterintuitive cryptography”

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