Credit cards are commodities. I don’t care whether my favourite co-brand credit card (in my case, John Lewis) is a Mastercard or a Visa card and I don’t care whether it comes from Citi or HSBC. Any of these combinations achieves the same purpose: I can pay for things in shops and I get cashback vouchers.
The vouchers are important. Javelin says that in across their history of consumer research, “reward programs remain a top driver” when it comes to choosing a card. But what if that changes? Whole the current U.S. card model means that a substantial portion of payment revenues are paid out as cardholder rewards, but that is the result of the interaction of regulatory and business arrangements, it is not a law of nature.
What if the rewards model changes? Organisations with a strategic perpsective are, I imagine, already taking a long-term view and preparing for a time when interchange revenue may be reduced.
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Visa and Mastercard set interchange rates but only get a small slice of the charges. It is credit card-issuing banks that collect the bulk of swipe fees. They often use the money to fund perks for cardholders, including cash back, points or airline miles.
From Mastercard/Visa: new bill will do little to challenge duopoly | Financial Times:
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There’s an interesting 2022 paper about this from Valdimir Mukharlyamov and Natasha Sarin at the UPenn Law School. The paper, “Price Regulation in Two-Sided Markets: Empirical Evidence from Debit Cards”, concludes that regulation to limit that amount banks can charge for debit transactions (ie, the Durbin Amendment of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act) led to higher checking account fees for consumers (previously subsidized) and accelerated the adoption of credit cards with higher interchange fees (cutting down on potential savings for merchants). In summar, the regulation’s stated objective of enhancing consumers’ welfare through lower retail prices was not met. Having looked at this issue across different markets and over many years, I have to say that I am not surprised and remain convinced that regulators should focus on more competion (from instant payments, for example) than trying to fix prices.